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Abstract
One important aspect of ¯nancial markets is that there might be some traders that
intentionally mislead other market participants by creating illusions in order to obtain
a pro¯t. We call this new concept illusionary ¯nance. We present an analysis of how
illusions can be created and disseminated in ¯nancial markets based on certain psy-
chological principles that explain agents' decisions under time pressure and polysemous
signals. We develop a simple model that incorporates the illusions in the price forma-
tion process. Furthermore, using powerful simulations, we show how illusions can be
incorporated, directly or indirectly, in the expected prices of the traders.
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11 Introduction
The e±cient market hypothesis (EMH) suggests that, at any time, prices fully and instan-
taneously re°ect all available relevant information on a particular stock or market (Fama
(1970)). The information contained in the prices also re°ects the way in which investors
perceive and interpret such information. Thus, no investor has an advantage in predict-
ing stock prices since no one has access to information not already available to everyone
else. Accordingly, the EMH states that it is impossible to "beat the market" because
prices already incorporate and re°ect all relevant information. More importantly, the EMH
framework assumes the existence of rational agents. This assumption is characterized by
two aspects. Firstly, the agents update their beliefs by correctly incorporating all relevant
information of the current situation, as well as expectations about the future opportunities
and risks. Secondly, they make choices that are normatively acceptable, i.e., consistent
with Savage's notion of subjective expected utility. However, in reality people's decisions
arguably often express a®ective evaluation (attitudes) that do not conform to the logic of
economic rationality. Moreover, most judgements and most choices are made intuitively.
In order to understand other important aspects that in°uence agents' decisions, one may
need to understand some human psychological principles [(Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin
(1997) and Kahneman (2003)).
One area in which researchers have linked psychology with economics is behavioral
¯nance, which provides explanations to well known market anomalies, such as: the stock
market overreaction and underreaction (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998),
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and DeBondt and Thaler (1985)); the persistence
of mispricing (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990); Shleifer and Vishny
(1997)); the survival of overcon¯dent traders in a competitive stock market (Hirshleifer
and Luo (2001)); and the market ine±ciencies that allow some individual skilled investors
to earn abnormal pro¯ts (Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway (2002)). The explanation for
these market anomalies brought from the psychological ¯eld are, for example, prospect
theory, representativeness heuristic, conservatism, overcon¯dence, gambling behavior, and
speculation. The behavioral ¯nance literature shows some limits of the e±cient market
hypothesis when psychological aspects are taken into account.
2In this paper, we introduce the concept of illusionary ¯nance. We present an analysis
of how illusions can be created and disseminated in stock markets. Our work is based on
certain psychological aspects that explain some agents' decisions under time pressure and
polysemous signals which are de¯ned as indicators that have multiple interpretations.1
Illusionary ¯nance studies how an agent can pro¯t from other agents psychological
biases, taking advantage of polysemous signals and time pressure. Illusionary ¯nance is
possible since agents cannot make fully-rational decisions all the time, at least in the eco-
nomic sense. Instead, they make their decisions based on "bounded rationality" (Kahneman
(2003)). The judgements that people express, the actions that they take, and the mistakes
that they make depend on the monitoring and corrective functions of reasoning, and on the
impressions and tendencies generated by their intuitions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the psychological bases
of illusionary ¯nance. Section 3 introduces the concept of illusionary ¯nance and explain
how to distinguish it from noise. Section 4, gives the intuition on the creation of illusions
in stocks markets and their in°uence on the price formation process. Section 5 explains the
simulation results and ¯nally and Section 6 concludes and provides an outlook for future
research.
2 Psychological foundations of illusionary ¯nance
In this section we introduce the concept of illusions that are important psychological fea-
tures, which might in°uence agents' decisions. The word illusion comes from the Latin
"illusio," which means the action of mocking, deceiving, the state or fact of being in-
tellectually deceived or misled, something that deceives or misleads intellectually, or the
perception of something objectively existing in such a way as to cause misinterpretation
of its actual nature.2 Agents can be subject to illusions; that is, agents do not experience
reality accurately, but instead experience something that appears and feels very real.
The de¯nition we adopt for illusions in ¯nancial markets is the perception of something
1For more information about the semantic concept of information and polysemous signals, please refer
to the works of Saussure (1967) and Dretske (1981).
2Merriam-Webster dictionary.
3objectively existing and created intentionally by someone in such a way that its actual
nature is misinterpreted. We call the illusionary trader the one who creates the illusion.
An illusionary trader creates an illusion by sending polysemous signals to the market and
taking advantages of the other traders psychological biases and time pressure in order to
obtain a positive return. The psychological notions that introduce illusionary trading in
stock markets are bounded rationality, intuition and reasoning, framing e®ects, attribute
substitution, and prospect theory.
In order to understand the foundations of illusionary ¯nance, we need to understand
that as any other economic agent, a trader in a stock market face cognitive processes like
those presented in Kahneman and Frederick (2002). Furthermore, they are confronted by
time pressure and polysemous signals when making their decisions; they must decide in
a very short period of time which information is important and incorporate it in their
information set in order to form their expectations. Based on Kahneman and Frederick
(2002), we present in the following some cognitive processes and their in°uence on traders'
decisions.
Cognitive processes can be divided into two families: intuition and reasoning.3 Intuition
is a process that is spontaneous, e®ortless, and fast. Reasoning is deliberate, rule-governed,
e®ortful, and slow. Usually, the relevant characteristic to di®erentiate between both systems
is the e®ort and the time used by the agent. We can imagine easily that a trader is subject
to these cognitive processes (intuition and reasoning) when he takes his decisions.
Although intuition is present in most of our judgements and choices, it is normally
monitored by reasoning (system 2). However, this monitoring is lax; many judgements and
choices are expressed even if some of them are erroneous. Intuition (system 1) can deal
with stored concepts and precepts and can be evoked by language. Intuition comes to mind
very fast in the form of percepts. The ease with which mental contents come to mind is
known as accessibility. Some attributes are more accessible than others. Attributes that are
routinely and automatically produced by the perceptual system 4 or by intuition have been
3According to the labels given by Stanovich and West (2000), intuition is known as system 1 and reasoning
as system 2.
4Perception is the awareness that comes from the stimuli of the physical world, the sensation of it and
our experience in interpreting it. Perception is the basic way of knowing reality. But although perception
seem accurate , it is often subject to weaknesses and limits, Cobb (1999).
4called natural assessments, such as similarity, causal propensity, surprisingness, a®ective
valence, and mood. Some determinants of accessibility are probably genetic, but others are
developed through experience. The acquisition of skill gradually increases the accessibility
of useful responses and of productive ways to organize information. Skills are acquired by
long exercises, but once they are obtained they come to the mind rapidly and e®ortlessly.
Thus, the cognitive system has two ways of adjusting to changes: a short-term process that
is °exible and e®ortless, and a long-term process of skill acquisition that eventually produces
highly e®ective responses at low cost. As stated by Kahneman, some of the most highly
skilled cognitive activities are intuitive, but the intuition is prone to systematic biases and
errors that are sometimes not corrected at all and are rarely corrected perfectly.
An important factor that in°uences the agents' judgements and decisions given by their
intuitions is the framing e®ect. The framing e®ect refers to problems that can be equiva-
lently described in many di®erent ways leading to di®erent choices simply by altering the
relative salience of di®erent aspects of them. The di®erent representations of the outcomes
highlight some features of the situation and mask others. Agents (i.e. traders) can react
di®erently depending on the highlighted and masked features. Furthermore, Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) argue that "people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simple judge-
ments operations;5 in general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to
severe and systematic errors."
Due to time pressure and time available for deliberation, people's ability to avoid errors
of intuitive judgement is impaired (Finucane, A., Slovic, and Johnson (2000)). This is true
for traders who need to take decisions on spot. For example, their ability is impaired by
concurrent involvement in several di®erent cognitive tasks if the agent is mentally occupied
by a demanding mental activity (Gilbert(1989, 1991, 2002)); by performing the task in
the evening for "morning people" and in the morning for "evening people" (Bodenhausen
(1990)); and surprisingly, by being in a good mood (Isen, Nygren, and Ashby (1988)).
5This is related to the concept of attribute substitution from Kahneman and Frederick (2002): "a judge-
ment is said to be mediated by a heuristic when the individual assesses a speci¯ed target attribute of a
judgement object by substituting another property of that object (the heuristic attribute) which comes
more readily to mind." This means that agents confronted with a di±cult question often answer an easier
one instead, usually without being aware of the substitution.
5Conversely, the facility of reasoning is positively correlated with exposure to statistical
thinking (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, and Kunda (1983), Agnoli and Krantz (1989) and Agnoli
(1991)) and with intelligence (Stanovich and West (2000)), a trait that psychologists have
labeled "need for cognition" (which is roughly whether people ¯nd thinking fun) (Sha¯r
and LeBoeuf (2002)).
In summary, agents do not make fully-rational decisions, at least in the economic sense.
Instead, their decisions are based on "bounded rationality".6 Kahneman (2003) refers to
bounded rationality as di®erent geographic maps of the same territory. With respect to
these boundaries of intuitive thinking, the judgements that people express, the actions that
they take, and the mistakes that they commit depend on the monitoring and corrective
functions of our reason (system 2) as well as on the impressions and tendencies generated
by our intuition (system 1).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) point out that agents' perceptions are reference-dependent;
the perceived attributes of a focal stimulus re°ect the contrast between that stimulus and
the context of prior and concurrent stimuli. The standard economic theory assumes that the
analysis of the utility of decision outcomes is determined entirely by the ¯nal wealth, and
it is therefore reference-independent. Based on experimentation, Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) concluded that people tend to change abruptly from risk-aversion to risk-seeking
accordingly to how the problem is presented. This feature could not be explained by a
utility function for wealth as preferences appear to be determined by attitudes to gains and
losses de¯ned relatively to a reference point. That is, they suggest an alternative theory
of risk in which the carriers of utility are gains and losses (changes of wealth rather than
states of wealth). This new theory is called prospect theory. The distinctive predictions of
prospect theory follow from the shape of the value function de¯ned on gains and losses. The
value function is characterized by three features: (1) it is concave in the domain of gains,
favoring risk aversion; (2) it is convex in the domain of losses, favoring risk-seeking; and
(3) the function is sharply kinked at the reference point and loss-averse (steeper for losses
than for gains by a factor of about 2-2.5 (Kahneman (1991) and Tversky and Kahneman
(1992)). The activity of traders in stock markets ¯ts the predictions of prospect theory very
6The notion of bounded rationality goes back to Simon (1957).
6well. Traders are much more interested in short term realizations rather than ¯nal wealth.
Prospect theory is concerned with immediate outcomes, in contrast with utility theory,
which de¯nes outcomes as states or as changes with only future consequences. The value
function of prospect theory presumably re°ects an anticipation of the valence and intensity
of the emotion that will be experienced at moments of transition from one state to another
(Kahneman (2000a), Kahneman (2000b) and Mellers (2000)).
3 Illusionary ¯nance
In this section, we show how illusionary ¯nance tricks ¯nancial markets. The psychological
aspects discussed in section 2 allow us to introduce the illusionary mechanism that can
be created in the stock market and embedded in the information set as if it were rele-
vant information and not an illusion. This illusionary mechanism is related to behavioral
¯nance given that in behavioral ¯nance literature, market anomalies are extensively re-
ported. Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway (2002) examine the fact that there are individual
investors capable of beating the market, which implies the violation of the semi-strong
form market e±ciency. They conclude by an interesting question: are the large brokerage
companies aware of the value of the information contained in their customers' trades? In
our framework, the fact that there are agents that are not aware of the relevance of the
information contained in trades means that it is possible to integrate an illusion into the
agents' information set.
It is also important to clarify how the illusionary trader takes advantage of the psy-
chological bias of the other market participants.7 Firstly, he sends a polysemous signal
with the intention to create a ¯nancial illusion for the other market participants. Secondly,
this sign is perceived by other traders. According to the perception of the signal, the type
of trader (information trader, noise trader8), and the external circumstances (bearish or
bullish market) including the time constraint to make decisions, the signal might be con-
sidered as information or noise. Following Thaler (1993) and Black (1986), we can de¯ne
7Illusionary traders di®er from speculators since speculators are those traders that pro¯t from information
they have about future prices (Harris (2003)), illusionary traders create illusions by sending polysemous
signals.
8As in Black (1986).
7noise as the opposite of news. Information traders trade on the basis of news (facts, fore-
casts, etc.). Noise traders trade randomly and not based on information.9 Even though the
information sets of the information traders and the noise traders are di®erent, information
traders might consider the illusion as noise or as information. If they consider the illusion
simply as noise, they do not use it in their information set and the illusion has no e®ect.
On the other hand, if they consider this illusion as information, they consider it in their
information set. We call this sub-group of traders believers.
The desired impact of the illusion depends on many factors that the illusionary trader
cannot control but that he can use when the opportunity shows up. The reason why
information traders trade on illusions is simple: they consider the perceived illusion not
as noise but as information. This is possible in stock markets because there is so much
noise in the market that they do not know if they are trading on noise or on information,
and when deciding about what is information, they can make mistakes. The illusionary
trader takes advantage of this situation to incorporate the illusion in the information set
of certain traders with the clear objective of pro¯ting from this situation. The fact that
believers take into account illusions may not be completely irrational. Even if they ¯gure
out that some information is indeed an illusion, it may nevertheless be rational to take the
illusion into account, as long as they believe that there are other believers in the market
who take the illusion into account. If no one takes the illusion into account and everyone
rationally anticipates that, then it is a best reply not to take it into account. However,
if everyone takes the illusion into account and again everyone rationally anticipates that,
then it is a best reply to take it into account.
Black (1986) presents a paper describing and explaining what noise is in stock markets.
He describes an information trader as someone who has the information or insights on
individual ¯rms and a noise trader as someone that trades on something else. Black (1986)
argues that noise makes ¯nancial markets possible, but also makes them imperfect. In this
paper, we add a new type of traders into ¯nancial markets called illusionary traders. These
traders send polysemous signals to the market and expect to pro¯t from this information.
According to Black (1986), information traders take advantage from their positions in
9For example they trade to match their own liquidity requirements because of inherited money or because
they want to buy a new car or house.
8trading with noise traders because they have some relevant information about individual
¯rms. With a lot of noise the information traders are more pro¯table, simply because prices
have more noise in them. However, the information traders can never be sure that they
are trading on information rather than noise. They can always think that the information
they have received has already been re°ected in prices, and then trading on this kind of
information will be just like trading on noise. When traders face a lot of information
arriving at the market, as long as we are talking about potentially relevant information,
the problem is that there are many possibilities to be ruled out before they can be sure to
have determined which information is relevant. In short, the more possibilities of potential
relevant information, the harder it is to ¯nd out what is relevant, and this fact can be used
by illusionary traders.
In Black (1986), the prices in the market re°ect both the information that the informa-
tion traders trade on and the noise that noise traders trade on. In the illusionary ¯nance
context, we add to this price formation setup the illusion that the believers trade on.
Illusionary traders add misleading signals (illusions) to take advantage from the traders
that we call believers. The group of believers can be either information traders or noise
traders.
One should note that Black (1986) did not consider traders that trade on illusions;
he only considered the noise traders explaining that noise traders are necessary for ¯nan-
cial markets to be operative. Illusionary traders are not necessary, but they may exist.
Moreover, recent ¯nancial frenzies and scandals cannot be the result of only noise. Our
contribution is to introduce the concept of illusionary ¯nance, which we think is more
realistic than considering only noise.
4 Simulations
In this paper our intention is to show using simulation techniques that it is possible to
create illusions that translate into positive returns. We argue that illusions imply superior
information for the traders who create them because they are the only ones that know
about them. These traders use this superior information for their own interest. We do not
9present a theoretical model of illusions. This and some other ideas presented hereafter are
left as open questions for future research. What we intend with this simulation is to show
the possibility of the existence of illusions in market-maker markets such as the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE). We develop a simulation for a single asset that is as random and
as little model controlled as possible.
The market-maker markets present the following features of intra-daily trading, that go
along with the ideas presented before:
² The speed of the transactions and the dissemination of information is fast, hence
traders are under big time pressure.
² There are polysemous signals arriving to the market and traders might not distinguish
between what is relevant, and what is noise and illusion.
² There is a large number of traders.
Following Glosten (1994) we de¯ne two kinds of traders interacting in the stocks markets:
patient and impatient traders. Impatient traders are the traders who submit market orders
(MO) and patient traders submit limit orders (LO). The reasons for submitting MO instead
of LO can be due to private information or due to liquidity reasons. In our paper the
focus is going to be on the impatient traders and we are going to assume that the book,
maintained by the market-maker, is exogenous and spontaneously re¯lled by the patient
traders. We also classify impatient traders into three types: (1) Information traders, who
neither believe nor incorporate the illusion in their decision sets. (2) Believers, who believe
in the illusion and incorporate it in their expectations about future prices. (3) Noise
traders who consider in their expectations "relevant" and "irrelevant" information without
distinguishing between them.
We de¯ne Nt as the proportion of impatient traders at time t (number of impatient
traders/total number of traders), and Mt the proportion of patient traders at time t (number
of patient traders/total number of traders).10 Thus, Nt + Mt = 1.
We assume that each trader can make a single trade each period, hence one trader equal
one trade.
10We assume that there is a given ¯xed number of traders during the whole simulation exercise.
10In our simulation we focus on the proportion of impatient traders (information traders,
believers and noise traders) which, by assumption, is equal to the number of trades. We
assume that the proportion of impatient traders (Nt) is not a®ected by the illusions. What
is a®ected however, is the proportion of these traders, i.e. some information traders become
believers. This is an important assumption in the simulation.
However, special care must be taken with respect to the timing of illusions in the market.
An illusion is sent to the market at time t11. There are some information traders who do
not consider it in their information set; however, in their information set of the next period
(t + 1), they will consider the prices at time t. Since prices at time t already contain the
illusion, these information traders are indirectly "believing" in the illusion.
In our framework the information traders (INF) at time t ¡ 1 forecast the asset price
for time t simply as:
E[PtjFINF








t is their expected price at t given their information set (FINF
t¡1 ) at t ¡ 1. The
information set at t ¡ 1 contains only information about past prices. Pt¡i are past prices.
n is the number of past price realizations that are taken into account to determine the
expected prices.
We assume that noise traders (NT) simply make random price expectations:12
¹ PNT
t = "t (4.2)
Believers' (B) expected prices are:
E[PtjFB
t¡1] = ¹ PB
t = ¹ PINF
t (1 + It) (4.3)
where ¹ PB
t is the believers' expected price for time t given their information set FB
t¡1, and
It is the impact of the illusions on the expected prices. It can depend on many di®erent
11This means that the illusion is available only at time t and is incorporated into prices at the same time.
12We can also assume that the noise traders set their expected prices equal to a mean, which is the same
for all market participants, plus a random zero-mean noise.
11psychological or economic factors. Moreover, the functional form of this relation can be of
many di®erent forms.13 In the present simulation, It is given by:
It = Ã(Nt¡1 + ´t¡1) µ »t¡1 (4.4)
where Ã(¢)=+1 or -1 is the desired sign of the illusion, Nt¡1 is the proportion of impatient
trades that occurred at time t ¡ 1, ´t¡1 is an additional proportion of trades that only ap-
pears if the market is in a bear period,14 µ is the illusionary trader size, an approximation
of the market power that can di®er across traders, and »t¡1 represents the quality of the
illusion. In principle we consider this quality to be a random variable with uniform distri-
bution on [0;1], but that can also be modeled. We use such randomness because there is
no reason to believe that all believers are going to be a®ected in the same way by di®erent
types of news or illusions. One can think of it as an average of the impact of the illusion
on the believers.
Knowing the proportion Nt of trades at time t (an exogenous variable in the present
setting), we can de¯ne the composition of the trades in terms of proportions. We assume
that the proportion of believers at time t (NB
t ) is given by:
NB
t = ±Nt (4.5)
with 0 · ± · 1 such that 0 · NB
t · Nt. Once we know NB
t we let the proportion of
information traders (NINF
t ) follow a uniform distribution on the interval [0;Nt ¡ NB
t ].
Finally, the proportion of noise traders is simply NNT
t = 1 ¡ NB
t ¡ NINF
t . Note that
in order to obtain NNT
t we subtract from 1 and not from Nt so that the totality of the
market participate in the price formation process. With this structure, even if they are
considered as exogenous, the patient traders participate randomly in the price formation
process. Hence, this is a °exible structure which allows us to simulate di®erent scenarios
like the one in which the market is composed mainly by information traders. For this, we
simply need to ¯x ® · NINF
t · Nt and 0 · NB
t · Nt ¡NINF
t , where ® ¸ 0 represents the
13This is left for future research. Moreover, we assume that sending an illusion is costless.
14With this we are able to capture the leverage e®ect proposed in Black (1976), i.e. that negative news
a®ect market participants more than positive ones.
12minimum proportion of information traders that are present in the market.
When the market is in a bear period, we want to capture the leverage e®ect observed
empirically. We de¯ne as bear-believers the traders who behave as information traders
in regular times (bull markets) but become believers in bear markets. Their proportion
(conditioned on the bear market) (´t) can be de¯ned in many di®erent ways,15 for simplicity




i.e., ´t is the fraction of the proportion of information traders that act as believers in bear
markets.
In this simple setup, we do not know anything about traders' demands given their price
expectations. Moreover, we do not know what their decision would be (buy, sell or not
to trade), according to their preferences for a given price expectation.16 Thus, we assume
that the actual price is a weighted average of the price expectation of the di®erent kind of
traders.17 According to these, the price of the asset at time t is:
Pt = NINF
t (1 ¡ NB
t Dt) ¹ PINF
t + NB
t (1 + NINF
t Dt) ¹ PB
t + NNT
t "t (4.7)
where Dt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if we are in a bear market and
0 otherwise. With this speci¯cation we do not assume that the illusion is the only noise
present in the market. The third term on the right-hand side of equation (4.7) captures
this idea and helps the simulations to be more realistic and less controlled.
In order to understand the dynamics of the proposed simulation let us show what
happens during the ¯rst two periods of trading. At time t ¡ 1 all kinds of traders ¯x
their strategies. The price at t according to Equation (4.7) has a component driven by the
expectations of the information traders ( ¹ PINF
t ), the expectation of the believers ¹ PB
t , and
the expectation of the noise traders ("t). At time t traders forecast the price for t+1. Here
one can observe that for the information traders the expected price for t + 1 is:
15We can think of de¯ning it as: ´t = ¼ N
INF
t , where ¼ is a uniform random variable on [0;1].
16This is an appealing topic for future research.
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Clearly the second term of the sum incorporates the illusion that in°uences indirectly the
information traders. In the case of the believers, as soon as the direct e®ect of the illusion
(It) disappears, their expectation converges to the information traders' expectations (see
equation (4.3)).
5 Results
For the starting values of our simulations we use observed features from the IBM stock: the
number of trades and the stock prices over 5-minute intervals. The data was from January
1st 1998 to March 31st 1998. The historical prices are given by the average mid-quote
during the time interval. The data we use was taken from the Trades and Quotes (TAQ)
dataset, produced by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). This data set contains every
trade and quote posted on the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ
National Market System for all securities listed on NYSE. Table 1 presents the descriptive
statistics of this data set.






Descriptive statistics for the number of trades and
mid-quote prices (in USD). The number of observa-
tions is 4636 and correspond to 76 5-minute intervals
for 61 trading days. The sample period goes from
01/01/98 to 31/03/98.
14As stated in Section 4 we assume that the number of trades is not a®ected by the
illusion, what changes is the composition of the di®erent kind of traders. Moreover, we
assume that:
² the number of trades follows a Poisson distribution with mean equal to the uncondi-
tional mean of the number of trades in 5-minute intervals of IBM (Table 1);
² the expected price of noise traders is assumed to follow a normal distribution with
mean and variance equal to the historical mean and variance of the series;
² for the initial composition of the impatient traders, uniform random numbers are
generated for each type: information traders, believers and noise traders;
² for the illusionary trader's size (µ), we chose it to be a uniform random variable in
the interval [0:01;0:15], which represents a relative measure of the traders' market
cap with respect to the total size of the traders actually intervening in the market;
² the market is bullish.
In order to determine the e®ect of the illusion, we assume that the illusionary traders
expect a random e®ect of their illusion based on equation (4.4). If they send a positive illu-
sion, they expect that prices go up. However, they also know that the believers will rapidly
realize that the illusion is not relevant information and rapidly correct their expectations,
forcing the prices to their normal level. Thus, they expect a fall of the prices in the next
period. Their strategy in this case is simply to sell after the illusion and buy back the asset
when the prices fall into their normal levels. However, it is important to note that given the
randomness of the market, the prices might not follow their expectations. In these cases,
they do the following:
² If the prices at t + 1 do not follow their expectations, given the illusion created at
time t, they do nothing (no action).
² If the prices at t+1 follow their expectations, they sell (buy) the asset if they posted
a positive (negative) illusion. If the prices at t + 2 do not fall (rise), they wait for a
15certain period looking for a price that is simply equal to or smaller (bigger) than the
price at which they sold (bought) in order to buy (sell) the asset.
Given the above explanations about the way the simulation is driven, we present the
results of a simulation based on 1000 replications. The size of the trader in terms of his
relative market capitalization is randomly selected from [0:01;0:15] in each replication, i.e.,
from a small to a large trader.
Figure 1 presents the results of applying the traders strategies described before. We
can see that this trading strategy gives a positive payo® as a result of the illusion sent to
the market. We see that the expected e®ect of the illusion is not always achieved, this is
the reason why there is a big proportion of zeros (no action).












Unit monetary income (vertical axis) resulting of applying the trader's strategy given the illusion sent to
the market. The number of simulations is 1000 (horizontal axis).
Figure 1: Traders strategy results
Table 2 presents some statistics of the payo®s obtained sending illusions to the market.
One should note that of 1000 illusions, only 241 allow the illusionists to apply their strategies
and to obtain a positive payo®. This situation happens because the illusion's impact on the
16prices is given by the believers expected prices, which by assumption are only a proportion
of the impatient traders, making their in°uence very limited.
Table 2: Traders strategy results: some statistics
Period max min mean std sum action no action
Bull 0,0997 0,0000 0,0040 0,0096 3,9634 241 759
This table present some results of the traders strategies given the illusions sent to the
market. The results are presented in monetary units for a trade of a single share. "Ac-
tion" refers to the number of times the expected traders' illusion has the desired impact
on the market prices. "No action" refers to the number of times when the trader's illusion
did not produce the desired e®ect and so the trader did not do anything.
Table 3 shows some statistics about the proportion of the di®erent kind of traders that
result as a consequence of illusions sent to the market. It also shows some statistics about
the price expectations of the di®erent traders. Looking at that table, one notices that the
maximum proportion of impatient traders (traders that submit market orders) represents
one quarter of the total market traders. From this group the information traders represent
the majority. We can see that the impact of the illusion is very small, with a maximum of
8:99% and a minimum of zero (no impact).
Table 3: Illusions impact
Period: Bull max min mean std
Impatient traders (%) 0.2367 0.0233 0.1098 0.0256
Information traders(%) 0.1733 0.0003 0.0542 0.0279
Believers (%) 0.0899 0.0000 0.0015 0.0075
Noise traders (%) 0.9993 0.8062 0.9444 0.0281
Expected price information traders 60.0155 59.9468 59.9778 0.0214
Expected price believers 61.1454 58.5995 59.9787 0.0815
Expected price noise traders 60.0445 59.9177 59.9777 0.0236
Realized prices 60.0701 59.8519 59.9777 0.0236
This table present some results of the impact of the illusions on the proportion of
believers and on the realized prices.
By assumption the largest group of traders are the noise traders, which includes the pro-
portion of patient traders who place their limit orders exogenously and randomly. Another
17interesting feature to observe is that the expected prices of the di®erent type of traders
are not very di®erent. These results are coherent with the price movements observed in
stock markets in which the prices cannot vary more than a certain level without triggering
a market halt.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduce the concept of illusionary ¯nance. Our analysis focus on how
the illusions can be created and disseminated in stock markets. We expose in a market
microstructure context, how a trader can pro¯t from other agents psychological biases,
taking advantage of polysemous signals and time pressure. Illusionary ¯nance proves to be
possible since agents cannot make fully-rational decisions all the time. Illusionary traders
take advantage from the believers which can be either information traders or noise traders.
Illusionary traders are not necessary for markets to be operative (as information and
noise traders) but they exist. Our contribution is thus to introduce the concept of illu-
sionary ¯nance, which is a realistic way to integrate the functioning of stock markets with
psychological aspects of the traders.
An interesting conclusion derived from our simulation is, that even though information
traders are skeptical about the illusions at time t, they end up indirectly including the
illusion in their forecast of the next period after the illusion was created, showing once
again the power the illusions have in ¯nancial markets.
In our study our intention was to show that ¯nancial illusions may exist in ¯nancial
markets even it is di±cult to detect them. A possible extension of our ideas is to develop
a theoretical model of illusions in which the existence and survival of the illusionary trader
can be shown. Another extension could be to develop a model which considers the impact
of illusions on the patient traders, i.e. in the traders that submit limit orders.
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